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Summary findings
Adams uses household-level data from a nationally  Regression analysis of the determinants of income
representative survey to analyze the impact of nonfarm  shows that land ownership is positively and statistically
income on income inequality in rural Egypt. After  related to the receipt of agricultural income but has no
pinpointing the importance of nonfarm income to the  statistical relationship to the receipt of nonfarm income.
rural poor, Adams decomposes total rural income among  This leads Adams to three conclusions:
five sources: nonfarm,  agricultural, livestock, rental, and  *  If policymakers are interested in reducing poverty
transfer.  and improving income distribution in rural Egypt, they
He shows that while nonfarm income represents the  should focus on nonfarm income - which not only
most important  inequality-reducing source of income,  accounts for almost 60 percent of total income for the
agricultural income represents the most important  rural poor but also favorably affects income distribution.
inequality-increasing source.  *  Nonfarm  income is an inequality-reducing source of
A 1 percent marginal increase in nonfarm income will  income in a land-scarce setting such as rural Egypt
cause the Gini coefficient of overall income to fall by  because inadequate land "pushes" poorer  households out
12.8 percent. But a 1 percent marginal increase in  of agriculture and into the nonfarm sector.
agricultural income will cause the Gini coefficient to rise  Agricultural income contributes most to rural
by 15.8 percent.  income inequality because it is highly correlated with
The reason for this difference has to do with land,  land ownership and with total rural income.
which is distributed very unevenly in this study.
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and Socioeconomic Performance Thematic Group" at the World Bank.In the past many researchers and policymakers have viewed the rural economy of
developing countries as being synonymous with agriculture.  According to this view,
rural households receive most of their income from the production of food and export
crops.
In more recent years, this view has begun to change.  There is now a growing
recognition that rural households receive their income from a diverse portfolio of
activities (Ellis, 1998), and that one of the most important of these activities is that
connected with the rural nonfarm sector.  In some cases the rural nonfarm sector - which
includes such diverse activities as government, commerce and services - is now seen as
providing the bulk of income to rural households.
This changed view is partly due to the evolving concept of the broader
relationship between agriculture, the rural nonfarn  sector and the poor.  During the 1970s
and early 1980s, Mellor and Lele (1972), Mellor (1976) and Johnston and Kilby (1975)
emphasized the growth linkages effects of agricultural growth.  According to this
literature, technological change in agriculture boosts production, thereby increasing the
incomes of landowning households.  In turn, these landowning households use their new
income to buy more labor-intensive goods and services, which are produced by the poor
working in small-scale firms in the rural nonfarm sector.  Thus, accelerated growth in
agriculture produces second- and third-round effects that benefit the rural economy in
two ways:  first, through production linkages that provide the poor with more food; and2
second, through consumption linkages that provide the poor with more employment and
income-earning opportunities in the rural nonfarm sector.
While the dissemination of high-yielding varieties of rice and wheat may have
had large multiplier effects on the rural nonfarm sector in certain Asian countries (Hazell
and Roell, 1983), in many developing countries these multiplier effects have been quite
small.  For example, de Janvry and Sadoulet (1993) argue that the unequal distribution of
land and income in Latin America (and other developing countries) mean that only a
handful of landowners benefit from the income effects of agricultural growth.  Since
these large landowners prefer to buy luxury items produced by imports, they do not
demand the type of labor-intensive goods and services which are produced by the poor in
the rural nonfarm sector. For this reason, de Janvry and Sadoulet argue that in land-
constrained areas of the developing world - like Latin America and certain parts of the
Middle East and Asia - focusing directly on the rural nonfarm sector might provide a
better way of increasing the income and employment opportunities of the poor.  In this
view, income earned in the rural nonfarm sector represents the agent of positive change
for the poor in the rural economy, rather than income earned from the traditional
agricultural sector.
Despite this changed view, there is still no agreement in the empirical literature on
two key issues, namely:  (a) what is the impact of rural nonfarm income on income
inequality?; and (b) what is the link between land, nonfarm income and overall rural
inequality?  On the one hand, studies by Lanjouw (1998) in Ecuador, Adams (1995) in
Pakistan and Chinn (1979) in Taiwan indicate that nonfarm income reduces rural income
inequality.  According to Adams (1995), nonfarm income benefits the poor because the3
share of nonfarm income varies inversely with both size of land owned and total rural
income.  On the other hand, studies in Africa have generally produced very different
results.  For instance, Reardon, Delgado and Matlon (1992) in Burkina Faso, Collier,
Radwan and Wangwe (1986) in Tanzania and Matlon (1979) in Nigeria find that nonfarm
income has a negative impact on rural income distribution because it is mainly large
landowners who receive nonfarm income.
Part of this inconsistency may be explained by differences in the key factor noted
above, namely, the distribution of land. In other words, in land-scarce, labor rich
countries - like Pakistan and much of Latin America - inadequate access to land may
tend to "push" poorer rural households out of agriculture and into the nonfarm sector.
Thus, in these countries, nonfarm income may have a positive impact on inequality and
poverty.  The obverse, then, could hold in land-rich, labor-scarce countries - such as
Africa - where ample land access may tend to keep most people in agriculture and  to
"pull" only richer households into the nonfarm sector.
This paper proposes to clarify the impact of nonfarm income and unequal land
distribution on rural income inequality by analyzing the results of a new, nationally-
representative household survey in Egypt.  The paper seeks to make three contributions.
First, it uses decomposition techniques to pinpoint the contribution of five different
sources of rural income - including nonfarm income - to overall rural inequality.  This is
useful because few past studies have used disaggregated, household-level income data to
analyze the contribution of different types of income to rural income inequality.  Second,
the analysis shows how small, exogenous changes in income from different sources
affects overall rural inequality and welfare.  Such information is useful to policymakers,4
as they consider specific policy measures to try to improve the distribution of rural
incomes.  Third, the paper uses regression analyses to identify the role of different factors
- including land ownership - in "determining" the level of different sources of rural
income.  This analysis finds that while land ownership is not significantly related to the
determination of nonfarm income, it is positively and significantly related to the
determination of agricultural and rental income.
The study proceeds in four further sections.  Section I presents the decomposition
of the Gini coefficient.  Section II presents the household data set from rural Egypt.
Section III analyzes the contribution of the various sources of income - including
nonfarm income - to overall rural inequality.  Section IV analyzes how exogenous
changes in various sources of income affect overall inequality and welfare, and Section V
discusses how land and other factors determine different types of rural income. Section
VI concludes.
I.  Decomposition of Income Inequality
At the start of any decomposition exercise, the question arises:  what measure of
inequality should be used?  Several different inequality measures have been proposed in
the literature.  Following Foster (1985) and others, the chosen measure should have five
basic properties.  They are:  (1) Pigou-Dalton transfer sensitivity; (2) symmetry; (3) mean
independence; (4) population homogeneity; and (5) decomposability.
Pigou-Dalton transfer sensitivity holds if the measure of inequality increases
whenever income is transferred from one person to someone richer.  Symmetry holds if
the measure of inequality remains unchanged when individuals switch places in the5
income order.  Mean independence holds if a proportionate change in all incomes leaves
the-measure of inequality unchanged.  Population homogeneity holds if increasing (or
decreasing) the population size across all income levels has no effect on the measured
level of inequality.
The property of decomposability allows inequality to be partitioned either over
sub-populations or sources. It is the latter type of decomposition that is the subject of this
analysis.  Ideally, an inequality measure can be regarded as source decomposable if total
inequality can be broken down into a weighted sum of inequality by various income
sources (for example, nonfarm and agricultural income).
One of the measures of inequality which meets the five preceding properties is the
Gini coefficient.  The source decomposition of the Gini coefficient can be developed as
follows.
Assume that within the chosen group there are n households deriving income
from K sources of income.  Using notation similar to Shorrocks (1983: 311), let y; denote
the total income of household i, where i = 1, . . ., n and Yik the income of household i from
source k, where k = 1, . . ., K.  Also, let the distribution of total household income be
represented by Y = (yl,.  . , yn) and the distribution of income component k be
represented  by Yk =  (yik,- *Ynk)-
Using this notation, the Gini coefficient (G) for the distribution of total income
within the group can be defined as:
G = (2 cov[Y, F(Y)])  (1)
p6
where  g denotes the mean household income of the sample and  F(Y) the cumulative
distribution of total household income in the sample (i.e. F(Y) = (f(y, ),.., f(y.  )) where
f(yi)  is equal to the rank of yi divided by the number of observations (n)) (Stark et al.,
1986: 259).
Equation (1) can be rewritten and expanded into an expresion for the Gini
coefficient that captures the "contribution to inequality" of each of the K components of
income:
2  n
G  =-E  (yi - E(y;  ))(f(y  *) -E  (f(y; )))  (2)
2  n  K
E  E  (Yik  E  (Yik  )) (f(y;  )-E  (f(y  i )))  (3)
mi=1 k=1
2K
G =-,  cov[Yk, F(Y)]  (4)
k=l
G  =K  (  CO[Y  F(Y  )]  (  cov[Yk, F(Yk )]  (Lk)  (5)
k=  cov[Yk,  F(Yk)]  gk 
where g.  k iS the sample mean of income from source  k  and F(Yk ) is the cumulative rank
distribution  of  income  from  source  k (i.e.  F(Yk) = (f(y 1 ),..,f(y0)),  where  f(yik)is
equal to the rank of  y ik  divided by the number of observation  (n)) .
Using the notation of Stark et al (1986: 725), the Gini coefficient can be written
as:
K
G  =  ERkGkSk  (6)
k=17
where:
Sk is the share of source  k of income in total group income  (i.e.  Sk  =  pk  /j),
G  k is the Gini coefficient measuring the inequality in the distribution of income
component k within the group, and
Rk is the Gini correlation of income from source k  with total income,' defined as:
cov[Yk, F(Y)]
cov[Yk,F(yk)]  (7)
Equation (6) shows that the effect of source k income on overall income
inequality can be broken down into three components:
(a) the share of income component k in total income (captured by the term Sk);
(b) the inequality within the sample of income from source k (as measured by Gk);
C  the correlation between source k income and total income (as measured by Rk).
The larger the product of these three components, the greater the contribution of
income from source K to overall income inequality.  However, it should be noted that
while Sk is always positive and less than one, Gk  is always positive and may exceed one
(if many of the source incomes are negative), and Rk  can fall anywhere on the interval
(-1,1).  When Rk is less than zero, income from source k is negatively correlated with
total income and thus lowers the overall Gini measure for the sample.
Using this decomposition,, it is possible to identify how much of overall income
inequality is due to a particular income source.  Assuming that additional increments of
an income source are distributed in the same manner as the original units, it is also8
possible to use this decomposition to ask whether an income source is inequality-
increasing or inequality-decreasing on the basis of whether or not an enlarged share of
that income source leads to an increase or decrease in overall income inequality.  On the
basis of equation (6):
g k =R  K GK  (8)
G
where gk is the relative concentration coefficient of income source k  in overall
inequality.
From equation (8) it follows that income source k is inequality-increasing or
inequality-decreasing according to whether gk is greater than or less than unity.2
II.  Data Set
Data come from a single-round, nationally-representative household budget
survey that was conducted in 1997 on 2,500 households in 20 different urban and rural
govemorates in Egypt.  This survey - the Egypt Integrated Household Survey - was
quite broad, collecting data on such diverse topics as:  income, expenditures, education,
employment, food consumption, health and nutrition, landownings, migration and rural
credit. 3 The sample frame used for selecting households in the survey was supplied by
the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS).4
The rural portion of this Egypt Integrated Household survey included 1,327 rural
households drawn from 17 rural govemorates.  Of this total, 26 households were
excluded because of missing or incomplete data.  The analysis is therefore based on data
from 1,301 rural households.9
The concept of income used in this study is fairly comprehensive, including
income received in kind as well as in cash.  A money value was imputed to receipts in
kind, household consumption or crops and crop by-products, and home-consumed
livestock.  Because of uncertainty about how to deduct imputed land rent from
agricultural income, no values for imputed land rent were calculated.  Similarly, because
of the thin rental market for housing in rural Egypt,5 no values were imputed for the rent
of owner-occupied housing.  Finally, because of uncertainty about how to accurately
calculate wage rates for family members, no values were imputed for family labor
involved in crop and livestock production.
Total income for each rural household was divided into five sources:
(1) Nonfarm - Includes wage earnings from nonagricultural labor, government
and private sector employment plus net revenues from non-farm enterprises;
(2) Agricultural - Includes net income from all crop production including imputed
values from home production and crop byproducts plus wages received from agricultural
labor;
(3) Livestock - Includes net returns from traded livestock (cows, bullocks,
buffalo, goats, sheep) and small animals (chickens, pigeons, rabbits, duck), plus imputed
values of home-consumed livestock (meat) and animal products (milk, cheese) plus
plowing services;
(4) Transfer - Includes net transfers and net remittances (in cash and in kind) plus
interest and dividends received from pensions and savings.
(5) Rental - Includes rents (in cash and in kind) received from ownership of such
assets as land, machinery and housing.10
Although  the reasons  for dividing income  into these five sources should  be
apparent,  the rationale  for distinguishing  between  agricultural  and livestock  income  may
need clarification. On the one hand, some  observers  may claim that within a rural
economy  it is artificial  (and empirically  difficult)  to distinguish  between  agricultural  and
livestock  income,  since  outputs from one - such as straw and crop residuals  from
agriculture,  and draft power  and manure from livestock  - are used as inputs in the other.
On the other hand,  the goal  of this study is to disaggregate  the sources  of income
inequality  as finely as possible. For this reason,  it seems essential  to distinguish  between
agricultural  and livestock  income,  because  these two income sources  have very different
effects  on inequality. According  to the data, the simple  correlation  between  agricultural
income  and total income is the highest of all five income sources: 0.844. By contrast,
the simple  correlation  between  livestock  income and total income is one of the lowest:
0.232.6
Table 1 presents  summary  data for the five sources  of income. The table shows
quite clearly  the importance  of rural income  other than agricultural  income. Agricultural
income  accounts  for less than one-quarter  - 24.6 percent - of total rural income. By
contrast,  nonfarm income  is the single most important  source,  accounting  for 42.2 percent
of total rural income. Although  definitions  of nonfarm income vary widely, 7 these
percentage  figures for nonfarm  income are comparable  to those recorded  in other studies.
For example,  a recent review  of rural  household  budget surveys  in 13 African,  Asian and
Latin  American  countries  found that nonfarm  income accounts  for between 13 and 72
percent  of total rural household  income (Braun  and Pandya-Lorch,  1991:  Table 13).8
According  to this review,  the contribution  of nonfarm income  to total rural income  is11
especially  high in those  countries  where unequal  land distribution  severely  limit income-
earning  opportunities  in agriculture.
The Gini coefficient  of percapita income  for the sample is: 0.532. On the one
hand, this Gini is quite a bit higher than  the Gini (0.321)  which can be calculated  from
per capita  expenditure  data for the sample. On the other hand, since income  data include
savings,  it is natural to expect  that the Gini coefficient  of income will be higher than that
for expenditure. Moreover,  the Gini coefficient  of income from this study seems  well
within  the range of income Ginis recorded  for other developing  countries. For instance,
the income Ginis recorded  in the most recent edition of World Development  Indicators
(1998:  Table  2.8) suggest  that Gini coefficients  of per capita household  income range
from a low of 0.420 (Bolivia)  to a high of 0.601 (Brazil). 9
In Table 2 the five sources  of income in rural Egypt are presented  by income
quintile  group. The results demonstrate  the importance  of nonfarm income for the poor.
The poor - that is, those in the lowest quintile  group - receive  almost  60 percent of their
mean  total per capita income  from nonfarm  income. This figure is 65 percent higher  than
that received  by the poor from agricultural  income,  and more than ten times that received
by the poor from transfer,  livestock  or rental income.' 10Evidently,  the very real land
constraints  in rural Egypt  - 75.7 percent of the households  in the sample  own no land"
force the poor to seek the bulk of their livelihood  from outside  agriculture.
Table 3 presents  another  way of showing  the dependence  of the poor on nonfarm
income. In this table households  are ranked  by size of land owned. Like other
studies,' 2 the data reveal an inverse  relationship  between  size of land owned and the share
of nonfarm  income. For the poorest (that is, landless  group),  non-farm  income accounts12
for 52 percent of mean total per capita income.  Not only do the poor receive over one-
half of their total rural income from nonfarm sources, but the poor receive twice as large
a share of income from nonfarm sources as they do from any other type of income,
including agricultural.  By contrast, agricultural income seems more important to the
larger landowning groups. After the two lowest landowning groups, the share of
agricultural income generally exceeds that of nonfarm.
III.  Income Inequality in Rural Egypt, 1997
Decomposing the Gini coefficient provides two ways of measuring the
contribution of any income source to overall income inequality.  First, it is possible to
identify how much of overall income inequality is due to any particular source of income.
Second, it can be asked whether inequality in an income source serves to increase or
decrease overall income inequality.1 3
Table 4 reports the results of the Gini decomposition.  The results show that while
nonfarm income has the largest share in total income (Sk), its contribution to overall
income inequality is relatively small (SkGkRk= 0.158).  In percentage terms, nonfarm
income contributes only 29.7 percent to overall income inequality.  By contrast,
agricultural income makes a much larger contribution to overall income inequality
(SkGkRk  = 0.214); in percentage terms, the contribution of agricultural income to overall
income inequality is 40.2 percent.  In fact, agricultural income makes the largest
contribution to overall income inequality, because each of the other three sources of
income - transfer, livestock and rental - account for less than 15 percent of income
inequality in rural Egypt.13
The data in Table 4 can be used to answer the question:  Why does nonfarm
income make a smaller contribution to rural income inequality than agricultural income?
On the one hand, nonfarm income has a larger share in total rural income (Sk)  than
agricultural income.  However, the source Gini (Gk) for nonfarm income is lower than
that for agricultural income (0.634 vs. 1.155); this shows that nonfarm income is
distributed more equally than that of agricultural income. 1
4 Moreover, the correlation of
source income with total income rankings (Rk) for nonfarm income is lower than that for
agricultural income (0.590 vs 0.750).  For these reasons then - a low source Gini and a
low degree of correlation with total income  -- nonfarm income makes a smaller
contribution to overall income inequality than agricultural income.
The decomposition results in Table 4 can also be used to distinguish between
inequality-increasing and inequality-decreasing sources of income.  According to the
relative concentration coefficients (gk) for the various income sources, three sources of
income - nonfarm, transfer and livestock - represent inequality-decreasing sources of
income.  This means that, ceteris paribus, additional increments of nonfarm, transfer and
livestock income will reduce overall income inequality.  By contrast, additional
increments of two sources of income - agricultural and rental - represent inequality-
increasing sources of income.
IV.  Exogenous Increases in Sources of Income
Using the decomposition formulations in Table 4 it is also possible to measure
how much an increase in any particular income source will increase or decrease overall
income inequality.  Taking household labor and production decisions as given, suppose14
there is an exogenous increase in income from source j, by some factor aj, such that yj
(aj) =  (1 + aj)yj.  Then following Stark et al (1986: 726):
=Sj(RjGj  - G)  (9)
Where G is the overall Gini coefficient,  and Sj,  Rj and Gj denote the income share,
Gini correlation and Gini coefficient of income source j.  Dividing by G gives
aGIa&. S.G.R.  (10)
G  G
Equation (10) states that the relative effect of a marginal percentage change in income
source j upon overall inequality equals the relative contribution of source j to overall
inequality minus the relative contribution to total income.  From equation (10) it follows
that a marginal increase in source j will reduce overall income inequality when:
(a) the Gini correlation between source j income and total income (Rj) is negative
or zero; or when
(b) income from source j is positively correlated with total income (Rj > 0) and
RjGj < G.
By contrast, in order for a marginal increase in source j to increase overall income
inequality, it is necessary for Gj > G (that is, the Gini coefficient of income source j is
higher than the Gini coefficient for overall income).  However, this condition is not
sufficient for an increase in source j to raise overall inequality, because the sign of
oG/alaj  will still be influenced by the strength of the Gini correlation between source j
income and total income (Rj).15
Table 5 shows the effects of a 1 percent increase in a particular income source on
overall income inequality.  The results underscore those of the previous table, namely,
that an increase in agricultural income will lead to the largest increase in overall income
inequality.  A 1 percent increase in agricultural income will cause income inequality to
rise by 0.084, which in percentage terms is equivalent to a 15.8 percent increase in the
Gini coefficient.  A 1 percent increase in rental income also raises overall income
inequality, while increases in all of the other income sources will lower overall
inequality.  With respect to nonfarm income, a 1 percent increase in this source of income
will lead to the largest decrease in overall income inequality:  a 1 percent rise in nonfarm
income will cause overall inequality to fall by 0.068, which is equivalent to a 12.8
percent fall in the Gini coefficient.  From these results it appears that efforts to improve
income distribution in rural Egypt should focus on expanding nonfarm income, because a
small increase in this income source does the most to improve the overall distribution of
income.
In addition to the income change analysis in Table 5, it is also possible to examine
how welfare responds to an exogenous change in income source j.  Welfare is a slightly
broader concept than income because a small increase in source j income will affect
overall welfare in two ways:  first, by raising source income (income effect); and second,
by altering the income distribution within the sample as a whole (distributional effect).
The income effect will typically have a positive effect on welfare, but the distributional
effect will have a positive or negative effect on welfare depending on whether or not
overall inequality has increased.16
To capture both the income and distributional aspects of welfare, Stark and
Yitzhaki (1982) have proposed a Sen's welfare index of the form:
W = pt (I - G)  (1
Where i' and G, as defined previously, are the mean household income of the sample and
the Gini coefficient of overall income inequality.  While the welfare weightings in this
expression are arbitrary, the framework is still useful for analyzing the average and
distributional effects resulting from a small increase in any particular income source.
If there is an exogenous increase in income from source j by factor  aj, then the
sign of the change in welfare (as measured by equation (I 1)) can be evaluated by taking
the derivative of W with respect to aj  On this basis, Leibbrandt et al (1996: 24) have
shown that the following relation holds:
Fj  (1  - RjGj)  (12)
where Rj is the Gini correlation of income from source j with total income, and Gj is the
Gini coefficient of source income.
Dividing equation (12) through by W, it can be shown that:
aw  1 )=S  1  -R.Gi  (13)
a  W  1-G
Where Sj  is the share of source j income in total income.
Equation (13) gives a measure of the marginal percentage change in welfare (as
measured by the Sen welfare index) resulting from a small exogenous percentage change
in income source j.  The equation shows that the marginal change in welfare is always17
positive.  The expression also states that the marginal change in welfare consists of two
components:  an income effect equal to Sj/1-G; and a distributional effect,
aW - (Sj/1-G). Since in the case under analysis Sj is always positive, 15the  income effect
is likewise positive.  For the same reasons, in this case, the distributional effect is always
negative, because aW < (Sj/1-G).
Table 6 shows the effect of a 1 percent increase in a particular income source on
the Sen welfare index.  The welfare effects vary greatly among the five sources of
income.  As might be expected, the largest improvements in welfare come from a
exogenous increase in nonfarm income.  A 1 percent increase in nonfarrn income causes
the Sen welfare index to rise by 0.56 percent; this is almost three times the percentage
increase in welfare that accompanies a rise in income from any other source.  For
example, a 1 percent increase in transfer income causes the Sen index to rise by only 0.19
percent.
The data in Table 6 show that the income and distributional effects of an
exogenous change in source income are different.  The 0.56 percent increase in the Sen
welfare index resulting from an increase in nonfarm income includes a large positive
income effect (0.908) and a large negative distribution effect (-0.345).  For the reasons
explained above, increases in all five of the income sources in Table 6 have a negative
distributional effect on welfare.  However, the largest negative distributional effect is
recorded by a 1 percent increase in agricultural income.  A 1 percent rise in agricultural
income causes a negative distributional effect of -.460.  This is not surprising, given the
fact that agricultural income -as measured by the source Gini (Gj) - is distributed so
unevenly.  1618
V.  Land and the Determinants of Income Inequality
At this point, one critical question remains to be answered:  Why is agricultural
income distributed so unequally and why does income for this single source make such a
large contribution to overall income inequality?  One plausible explanation was broached
at the very outset of this paper, namely, the close relationship between agricultural
income and land.
In Egypt, as in many developing countries, land is distributed far more unequally
than income.  Whereas the Gini coefficient for per capita income in this study is 0.532,
the Gini coefficient of landownership (including households with no land) is 0.899.  "
In other words, since land is distributed so unevenly, and land is such a vital component
of agricultural production, it can be argued that it is the land-agriculture tie that "causes"
agricultural income to go mainly to the rich in rural Egypt.
One useful means for investigating the veracity of this hypothesis is to try to
quantify the character of the relationship between land and agricultural income in rural
Egypt. This can be done by using multivariate regression analysis to identify the
"determinants" of the five sources of income - including agricultural income - in this
study.  The challenge in such an analysis is twofold:  first, to identify those exogenous
household-level factors (including landownership) which somehow "cause" income to be
produced; and second, to pinpoint the relative importance of each of those factors in
producing different types of income (such as agricultural and nonfarm income).
In the strictest sense, most of the relevant income-producing variables that can be19
identified in this data set reflect a series of endogenous rather than exogenous choices
made by the household.  However, the management and taste factors that affect such
choices should be fixed, and, therefore should not seriously bias the regression estimates.
Following the standard household model, it can be assumed that a rural household
maximizes utility by allocating the land, labor and capital of its family members to
various agricultural and non-agricultural tasks.  From the first-order optimum conditions,
we can derive land, labor time and capital service allocation functions to various
household tasks that commonly depend on a set of factor prices, technology, personal
characteristics of household members, and ownership of land and nonland resources.
Factor prices (including land rent and residual return to land) depend on technology and
personal household characteristics (such as management ability) that cannot be assumed
to be exogenous.  For this reason, it is desirable to estimate the factor price and factor
allocation functions simultaneously.  Unfortunately, this procedure cannot be used here
because the quantities and prices of household-supplied factors for most household
activities cannot be accurately estimated, either in this or most other household-level
surveys. Therefore, in this section we estimate the reduced form income determination
functions without distinguishing factor prices and quantities, which depend on
technology, ownership of resources, and other household characteristics.
Specifically, in order to identify the determinants of income, we regress each of
the five sources of income in this study - nonfarm, agricultural, transfer, livestock and
rental - on three types of household-level inputs which are thought to cause income:  land
(i.e. size of landowned, size of land rented in); labor (i.e. household size, number of
males over age 15, education of males); and capital (i.e. value of livestock owned, value20
of farm equipment owned, value of enterprises owned).  In addition, since the data come
from widely scattered rural areas, differences in land, water and other inputs may affect
the determination of income.  For this reason, 16 governorate-level dummy variables are
included in the model.  Table 7 reports means and standard deviations for the model.
The results of the model, which are estimated using ordinary least squares, are
shown in Table 8.  The findings point to the key role that land plays in the determination
of agricultural income.  Land owned is positively and statistically related to agricultural
income; the point estimates suggest that an exogenous increase of one feddan in the
amount of land owned by the household will result in a 101 LE increase in per capita
household income from agriculture.  With the exception of rental income, an increase in
household landowning does not have a statistically significant impact on any other type
of income, including nonfarm income.  In fact, for nonfarm income an exogenous
increase in the amount of land owned by the household actually leads to a (statistically
insignificant) reduction in per capita household income from nonfarm sources.  These
results suggest that while agricultural income is positively associated with
landownership, which is unevenly distributed in favor of the rich, nonfarm income is not
linked with landownership and thus is more important to the poor.
While pointing to the strong links existing between land and agricultural income,
the findings in Table 8 do not address the key question of causality.  In other words, is it
inequality in land ownership which leads to unequal income distribution or is it uneven
income distribution which causes the high concentration of land ownership?  To
adequately answer this question for rural Egypt would require more data, specifically,21
panel data on how changes in the distribution of various sources of income are related to
changes in the ownership of land.'8
VI. Conclusion
This study has used decomposition analysis on a nationally-representative data set
from rural Egypt to examine the impact of five sources of income - including nonfarm
income -- on rural income inequality.  Three key conclusions emerge.
First, the study shows that if policymakers are interested in reducing poverty and
improving income distribution in rural Egypt then they should focus on nonfarm income.
Not only does nonfarm income account for almost 60 percent of the total per capita
income of the rural poor (i.e. those in the lowest income quintile group), but it also has a
favorable impact on overall income distribution.  Of the five sources of income examined
in this study, a 1 percent marginal increase in nonfarm income will lead to the largest
decrease in overall rural income inequality.  A 1 percent increase in nonfarm income will
cause overall rural income inequality to fall by 0.068, which is equivalent to a 12.8
percent decline in the Gini coefficient of overall income.  By contrast, a 1 percent
increase in any other inequality-decreasing source of income - such as transfer or
livestock income-will  only lead to a 3.2 percent decline in the Gini coefficient of
overall income.
Second, as de Janvry and Sadoulet (1993) have suggested, this study affirms the
close tie between land, nonfarm income and the poor.  Nonfarm income is an inequality-
decreasing source of income in a land-scarce, labor-rich setting like rural Egypt because
inadequate land access "pushes" poorer households out of agriculture and into the22
nonfarm sector. In this study 75.7 percent of households own no land and the Gini
coefficient of landownership (0.899) is much higher than the Gini coefficient of income
(0.532).  For this reason, regression analysis shows that while the amount of household
land owned is positively and statistically related to the receipt of agricultural income,
household land owned has no statistical relationship with the receipt of nonfarm income.
In other words, while agricultural income is positively associated with landownership,
which is unevenly distributed in favor of the rich, nonfarm income is not linked with
landownership and thus is more important to the poor.
The third and final finding follows directly from the above. Agricultural income,
which is the second most important source of income in this study, is an inequality-
increasing source of income.  For example, a 1 percent marginal increase in agricultural
income will lead to the largest increase in overall rural income inequality.  A 1 percent
rise in agricultural income will lead to a 15.8 percent increase in the Gini coefficient of
overall income. Agricultural income makes the largest contribution to overall rural
income inequality in this study because it is unevenly distributed and it is highly
correlated with total income.23
Notes
As noted by Leibbrandt  et al (1996:  4), Rk  is a form of rank correlation  coefficient,  because  it measures
the extent  to which  the relationship  between  Yk and the rank  distribution  of total income  coincides  with  the
relationship  between  Yk  and its own  rank distribution.
2 This  analysis  ignores  feedback  effects,  that is, the effects  that a change in any source  income  share  might
have on distribution  within any source  income. Of course,  such an assumption  might  be quite  unrealistic
for large  changes  in any source  income  share.
3 This  household  survey  was conducted  by the International  Food  Policy  Institute,  working  in collaboration
with the Egyptian  Ministry  of Agriculture  and  the Egyptian  Ministry  of Trade  and Supply.
4 For more details  on this 1997  Egypt Integrated  Household  Survey,  see Datt, Joliffe  and Sharma  (1998).
5According  to the data,  90 percent of rural  households  in the survey own  their own house.
6 Only  the simple  correlation  between  transfer income  and total income  (0.204)  is lower  than that for
livestock  income. The simple  correlations  for the other  source  incomes  are: nonfarm  income,  0.362;  and
rental  income,  0.442.
7 It should  be noted that  the definition  of nonfarm  income  used here is narrower  than those used in other
studies. For example,  Reardon  (1997) includes  migration  (remittances)  income  in nonfarm  income  while
Chinn  (1979) includes  rental income.
8For other  estimates  of the share of nonfarn income  in total rural income,  see Reardon  (1997)  on Africa,
and Hazell  and Haggblade  (1993)  on Latin America.
91t  should be noted, however,  that these  Ginis  of per capita  household  income  for Bolivia  and Brazil  are
based  on the distribution  of overall  (that is, urban  and rural) incomes,  while the income  Ginis  used in this
study  are based on rural household  income. In theory,  one  would expect  that  the distribution  of rural
household  income  to be more  egalitarian  than that of overall  household  income.
'° Non-farm  income  is also important  to the poor, when  the poor are defined  on the basis  of
expenditure  rather  than income  data. Appendix  Table I, where  the quintile  groups  are based on total  per
capita  expenditures,  shows  that  the poor -those in  the lowest  quintile  group  - receive  almost  45 percent  of
their  total per capita income  from nonfarm  income.24
"There is an active  rental market  for land in  rural Egypt. Thus,  while 75.7 percent of the survey
households  own  no land,  in terms of land access  (that is, land owned  plus land  rented  in) a slightly  smaller
percentage  (61.6 percent)  of the survey  households  have  no land access.
'2For example,  on Pakistan  see Adams  (1994),  on India  see Walker  and Ryan (1990),  and on Malaysia  see
Shand  (1986).
'31n  analyzing  whether  an income  source  is inequality-increasing  or -decreasing, it is assumed  that
additional  increments  of that income  source  are distributed  in the same  fashion  as the original  units.
141n fact, nonfarm  income  is the most equally  distributed  source  of income  in the study,  because  it has the
lowest  source  Gini (Gk)  in Table  4.
'As shown  in Table 4, the shares  of source  income  in total income  (Sk) are all positive.
'6According  to Table  4, the source  Gini  (Gk) for agricultural  income is 1.155. The source  Gini  for
agricultural  income  exceeds  unity in  this table because  16.5  percent of the households  have negative
agricultural  incomes.
'7Excluding  the households  with  no land,  the Gini  coefficient  of landownership  is 0.532.
IsFor an interesting  effort  to use cross-national  data to examine  the nature  of the casual  relationship
between  income  and land in a sample  of 28 developing  countries,  see Quan (1989).25
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Table  1. Summary  of income data  from rural  Egypt,  1997.
Source of  Mean  Annual  per  Capita  Standard
Income  Household  Incomea in LEb  Deviation
Nonfarm  414.09  626.13
Agricultural  241.29  1,161.30
Transfer  150.91  360.84
Livestock  92.60  268.71
Rental  81.26  311.56
Total  980.15  1,480.69
Source: IFPRI Egypt Integrated Household Survey, 1997
Notes: N= 1301 households.
(a) Mean income figures include negative source incomes for some households.
(b) In 1997, 1 Egyptian pound (LE)= US $0.295. All income figures in nominal terms.30
Table 2. - Sources of income in rural Egypt ranked by quintile on the basis of total per
capita household income
Percent  of Total Per  Capita  Income  from
Total  Average
Per Capita  Total Per
Income  Capita  Nonfarm  Agricultural  Transfer  Livestock  Rental
Quintilea  Incomeb
(LE)
Lowest  4.38  59.0  35.8  2.6  5.4  (-2.8)
Second  402.35  52.1  18.7  19.5  8.3  1.4
Third  615.52  51.3  19.4  16.1  10.6  2.6
Fourth  955.25  52.5  20.4  15.1  8.2  3.9
Highest  2455.28  38.4  26.0  16.6  8.6  10.4
Total  980.83  50.0  23.9  14.3  8.3  3.5
Source:  IFPRI  Egypt  Integrated  Household  Survey, 1997
Notes: N= 1301  households.
(a) Quintile  groups  based on population  (not households)  because  poorer  households  tend to be larger.
(b) In 1997,  1 Egyptian  pound  (LE)= US $0.295.  All income  figures  in nominal terms.31
Table  3. Sources  of income  ranked  by size of land owned
Percent  of Total  Per Capita  Income  from
Number  of  Average
Size of  Households  Total Per
Land  in Group  Capita  Nonfarm  Agricultural  Transfer  Livestock  Rental
Owned  Incomea
(Feddans)
0  982  885.94  51.8  23.7  18.5  3.4  2.6
<1  159  879.53  67.2  (-1.5)  (-3.4)  40.8  (-3.1)
1-<3  115  1630.32  23.9  55.4  5.0  2.2  13.5
3-<5  26  1565.59  13.6  41.5  3.2  21.8  19.9
5-<10  10  1383.14  36.8  35.4  1.4  12.4  13.9
>10  9  2513.01  20.7  24.4  10.4  12.5  32.0
Total  1301  980.83  50.0  23.9  14.3  8.3  3.5
Source:  IFPRI  Egypt Integrated  Household  Survey, 1997
Notes: N= 1301  households.
(a) In 1997, 1 Egyptian  pound  (LE)= US $0.295.  All income  figures  in nominal  termsTable 4. Decomposition  of overall income inequality  in rural  Egypt
Proportion
of  Gini  Contribution  Relative  Percentage
households  Gini  correlation  of income  concentration  contribution
receiving  Share  coefficient  with total  source  coefficient of income  to overall
income  in total  for income  income  to overall income  source  income
Income Source  source  income  source a  rankings  inequality  GK  inequality
(PK)  (SK)  (GK)  (RK)  (SKGKRK)  (g=RK  G  n
Nonfarm  0.607  0.422  0.634  0.590  0.158  0.703  29.7
Agricultural  0.669  0.246  1.155  0.750  0.214  1.628  40.2
Transfer  0.509  0.154  0.848  0.488  0.064  0.778  12.0
Livestock  0.695  0.094  0.935  0.376  0.034  0.661  6.4
Rental  0.317  0.083  0.924  0.805  0.062  1.398  11.7
Total  1.000  1.000  - - 0.532  - 100.0
Notes:  N= 1301 households. All estimates are based on annual per capita household
Income.
(a). Source ginis are high because they include households with zero and negative incomes
from different income sources.  Source ginis can exceed unity if many of y, are
negative.33
Table 5.-Effects of a 1 percent increase in a source income on overall income inequality
Source of  Absolute change in overall  Percent change in  Mean annual per
income  Gini coefficient  by 1  overall Gini  capita household
percent change in income  coefficient by 1  income in LE'
source  percent change in
income source
Non-farm  -0.068  -0.128  414.09
Agricultural  0.084  0.158  241.29
Transfer  -0.017  -0.032  150.91
Livestock  -0.017  -0.032  92.60
Rental  0.018  0.034  81.26
Note: N= 1301  households.
(a) In 1997,  1  Egyptian  pound (LE)=  US $0.295. All income figures  in nominal terms.34
Table 6. - Effects of a 1 percent increase in a source income on the Sen Welfare
Index
Income  Percent change in Sen welfare  Income effect  Distribution
source  index by a 1 percent change in  effect
income source
NonfaTm  0.563  0.908  -0.345
Agricultural  0.070  0.530  -0.460
Transfer  0.193  0.332  -0.139
Livestock  0.131  0.204  -0.073
Rental  0.045  0.179  -0.134
Notes: N= 1301  households.35
Table 7 - Means and standard deviations for determinants of rural income regression
Source of income
Variable  Nonfarm  Agricultural  Transfer  Livestock  Rental
Amount of land owned  0.35  0.65  0.50  0.59  1.24
by household (feddans)a  (1.67)  (2.02)  (2.11)  (1.95)  (2.80)
Amount of land rented  0.15  0.29  0.16  0.27  0.38
in by household (feddans)a  (0.55)  (0.86)  (0.73)  (0.84)  (1.03)
Household size  6.92  7.48  6.45  7.30  7.96
(3.37)  (3.75)  (3.59)  (3.73)  (4.07)
Number of household  2.02  2.13  1.75  2.06  2.35
males over 15 years  (1.33)  (1.39)  (1.29)  (1.39)  (1.51)
Number of household  0.97  0.85  0.78  0.85  0.98
males with preparatory  (1.04)  (1.01)  (0.98)  (1.00)  (1.06)
education or higher
Value of livestock owned  945.95  1778.47  1106.39  1733.12  2388.47
(LE)b  (2045.18)  (2531.79)  (1895.44)  (2496.41)  (2785.97)
Value of farm equipment  521.02  799.25  626.29  700.95  1508.98
owned (LE)b  (4190.41)  (4550.99)  (4358.24)  (4164.76)  (6515.85)
Value of enterprisesc  1715.26  842.16  548.45  948.74  1244.07
owned (LE)b  (8433.54)  (6515.79)  (3524.86)  (6753.13)  (8980.19)
N  791  870  663  905  412
Notes:  Standard  deviation  in parentheses. Governorate  - level dummy  variables  are not reported.
(a) 1 feddan  = 1.038  acres
(b) In 1997,  1 Egyptian  pound  (LE)=  US 0.295. All income figures  in nominal  terms.
(c) Enterprises  include  shops,  stores, pharmacies  and other  business  activities.36
Table 8 - Regression analysis of determinants of rural income
Annual per capita household income from:
Variable  Nonfarm  Agricultural  Transfer  Livestock  Rental
Land
Amount of land owned  -9.149  101.449  -1.033  -0.495  27.807
by household  (-0.622)  (4.027)**  (-0.116)  (-0.106)  (2.994)**
Amount of land rented  -22.848  -228.729  -2.171  6.955  -24.896
in by household  (-0.498)  (_3.993)**  (-0.085)  (0.658)  (-1.009)
Labor
Household size  -68.749  -32.324  -39.023  -21.932  -42.366
(-7.297)**  (-1.774)  (-5.767)**  (-6.595)**  (-4.665)**
Number of household  17.077  24.642  -21.971  -10.636  -4.768
males over 15 years  (0.619)  (0.430)  (-0.993)  (-1.029)  (-0.165)
Numberofhousehold  68.375  -18.311  13.397  4.651  -18.192
males with preparatory  (2.384)*  (-0.296)  (0.563)  (0.418)  (-0.596)
education or higher
Capital
Value of livestock owned  0.002  0.006  -0.007  0.076  -0.002
(0.118)  (0.308)  (-0.684)  (19.548)**  (-0.158)
Value of farm equipment  1.136  0.009  0.002  0.005  0.005
owned  (0.007)  (0.796)  (0.432)  (2.398)*  (1.193)
Value of enterprises owned  0.014  0.001  -0.003  0.001  0.003
(5.001)**  (0.082)  (-0.583)  (0.803)  (1.020)
Constant  998.307  254.012  486.726  88.875  363.936
(8.444)**  (0.803)  (3.242)**  (1.324)  (1.990)*
N  791  870  663  905  412
AdjustedR2 0.152  0.032  0.101  0.345  0.118
F  - statistic  6.89  2.19  4.10  20.83  3.28
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics (two-tailed).
Govemorate-level  dummy  variables are not reported.  The dependent variable is annual per capita household
income from the particular income source.
*  Significant at the .05 level.
**  Significant  at  the  .01  level.37
Appendix Table 1. - Sources of income in rural  Egypt ranked by quintile on the basis
of total per capita household expenditures
Percent  of Total Per  Capita Income  from
Total  Average
Per Capita  Total Per
Expenditure  Capita  Nonfarm  Agricultural  Transfer  Livestock  Rental
Quintile'  Incomeb
(LE)
Lowest  530.21  43.6  34.7  17.0  2.8  1.9
Second  628.00  70.5  (-10.2)  22.2  15.1  2.3
Third  778.34  55.2  11.9  8.6  21.2  3.1
Fourth  949.30  43.6  35.5  10.8  5.6  4.5
Highest  1754.88  40.4  41.6  13.4  (-0.6)  5.5
Total  980.83  50.0  23.9  14.3  8.3  3.5
Source: IFPRI Egypt Integrated Household Survey, 1997
Notes:  N= 1301 households.
(a)  Unlike Table 2, quintile groups in this table are based on total per capita expenditures (not income).
Quintile groups are based on population (not households) because poorer households tend to be larger.
(b)  In 1997, 1 Egyptian pound (LE)= US $0.295. All income figures in nominal terns.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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